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Shame Agent
Joan W. Howarth
“Shame is the shawl of Pink 
        In which we wrap the Soul….”
    Emily Dickinson
 
Introduction 
As a nation, we have recently experienced a significant positive shift in 
norms against casual campus sexual violence. These changes are perhaps 
as dramatic as the attitudinal shifts over recent decades regarding drunk 
driving or cigarette smoking. In a world in which masculinity is too often 
associated with sexual conquest, and women still suffer under intense and 
conflicting pressures regarding their sexual behavior, pushing this potential 
transformation forward is both difficult and necessary. Enforcement of Title 
IX protections has become a crucial driver of much of this change. 
This is an account of some of what I learned as a participant in Title 
IX sexual misconduct enforcement at my law school and university.  As 
with drunk driving and smoking, the newly strengthened norms against 
nonconsensual campus sex result from a combination of public activism, 
new laws and regulations, new enforcement of existing laws and regulations, 
and purposeful steps taken by strong institutional leaders. Michigan State 
University (MSU) exemplifies all this. Indeed, my optimism on these issues 
is grounded in my experience at MSU. MSU is a particularly good source of 
relevant lessons. MSU features some aspects of campus culture that have been 
found to be most related to sexual violence, including strong Greek life and 
heavy presence of athletics.1
1. See, e.g., Todd W. Crosset, Athletes, Sexual Assault, and Universities’ Failure to Address Rape-Prone 
Subcultures on Campus, in The Crisis of Campus sexual ViolenCe: CriTiCal perspeCTiVes on 
preVenTion and response 74 (Sara Carrigan Wooten & Roland W. Mitchell eds., 2016); 
peggy reeVes sanday, fraTerniTy gang rape: sex, BroTherhood, and priVilege on 
Campus (2007); Katharine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive: Title IX’s Unrealized Capacity to Prevent 
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Colleges and universities are often diverse communities with significant 
numbers of students, faculty, and staff from around the world. The splendid 
diversity of a university brings differences in norms and expectations 
regarding gender roles and sexual conduct as much as it brings difference in 
food preferences or primary languages. International presence on campus and 
MSU’s footprint around the globe are key parts of MSU identity.
Also, MSU is one of the scores of colleges and universities recently 
investigated by the Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) of the United States 
Department of Education (“DOE”) for potential Title IX violations related to 
sexual harassment or sexual violence.2 The OCR investigation of MSU began 
with two complaints of misconduct from 2011, and was finally resolved with a 
resolution letter in September 2015.3 I served as dean of MSU Law for eight 
years that preceded, coexisted, and followed the formal OCR investigation of 
MSU.4  
MSU faced heavy pressure from the Department of Education, and in some 
sense that pressure transformed the campus, with new university resources, 
overhaul of the Title IX regimen, new and visible student activism, and 
hypersensitivity to Title IX procedural compliance. I found MSU leadership 
to be sincere, effective, and dedicated to responding appropriately to create 
a nondiscriminatory and safe campus environment. Campus sexual violence 
Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.u. l. reV. 1049, 1072 & n. 92 (2015) (“In addition, both fraternities 
and sports teams have been associated with heightened risk of rape perpetration on college 
campuses,” citing to Stephen E. Humphrey & Arnold S. Kahn, Fraternities, Athletic Teams, 
and Rape: Importance of Identification with a Risky Group, 15 J. inTerpersonal ViolenCe 1313, 1314 
(2000) (“Much literature has focused on fraternity and athletic team members as more likely 
than their nonmember colleagues to commit sexual assaults.”)); see also Deborah L. Brake, 
Sport and Masculinity, in masCuliniTies and The law: a mulTidimensional approaCh 207, 
208 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) (“[S]port remains a primary site 
for construction of masculinity.”).  
2. See u.s. dep’T of eduC., u.s. deparTmenT of eduCaTion releases lisT of higher 
eduCaTion insTiTuTions wiTh open TiTle ix sexual ViolenCe inVesTigaTions (May 
14, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-
higher-education-institutions-open-title-ix-sexual-violence-investigations.
3. See u.s. dep’T of eduC., miChigan sTaTe uniVersiTy resoluTion agreemenT, oCr 
doCkeT nos. 15-11-2098 & 15-14-2113, http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/
michigan-state-letter.pdf (last visited June 6, 2017). The OCR’s 2011 Dear Colleague Letter 
shaped the landscape during this time as well. See Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn 
Ali, Assistant Secretary, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [hereinafter Office for 
Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter]. 
4. Due to an unusual governance structure that provides MSU College of Law more autonomy 
than other colleges at MSU and other university-based law schools, my work in Title 
IX compliance included more oversight and decision-making authority for resolution 
of complaints involving law students than is typical for a dean.  I also had very limited 
experience with complaints not involving the law school. I am not describing specifics of 
any actual cases I was involved with, but instead am providing fictional hypotheticals to 
highlight some issues I saw. 
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became a highly visible focus of student activism.5 Some days I had the 
exhilarating and somewhat unsteady sense of being in the midst of what Cass 
Sunstein might recognize as a norm cascade.6  
I am grateful for the creative explosion of student activism laser-focused 
on the pressing need for widespread culture change to reduce violence against 
women. My personal resume includes leadership in feminist antiviolence 
organizations and campaigns, including a particular focus on changing the 
culture that minimizes, romanticizes, and sexualizes violence against  women.7 
I  applaud this movement for campus safety, and have learned a great deal 
from student activists leading these campaigns.8 
However, respectful criticism of some aspects of Title IX compliance may 
be more useful than more praise. My purpose here is to reflect on some of my 
misgivings about the operation of the Title IX compliance regime in which I 
participated. In spite of strong university and law school support, earnest and 
admirable complainants, and my serious commitment to addressing violence 
against women, my role was sometimes troubling.  
I imagined that I would be vindicating women students’ sexual autonomy 
and freedom, and protecting vulnerable students. That was often true, but not 
always. At my worst moments, I felt like an agent of the Anti-Rape Culture 
so powerfully criticized by Aya Gruber9 or a reluctant Sex Bureaucrat, as 
5. For example, when the university awarded honorary degrees to columnist George Will 
and filmmaker Michael Moore, Moore joked that he was enjoying being the mainstream, 
noncontroversial speaker. George Will’s presence caused protest and disruption, including 
teach-ins and an alternative commencement ceremony, because of a particularly offensive 
column Will had published earlier that year, but after the invitation, decrying what he 
called a politically correct campus atmosphere in which rape victims had a coveted status. 
See George F. Will, Colleges Become the Victims of Progressivism, wash. posT, June 6, 2014, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-college-become-the-victims-of-
progressivism/2014/06/06/e90e73b4-eb50-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html?utm_term=.
a0c21dcbd685. 
6. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. l. reV. 903, 909 (1996) (“[N]orm 
cascades occur when there are rapid shifts in norms.”). For a similarly optimistic account 
of recent improvements regarding campus sexual assault, see Alexandra Brodsky, A Rising 
Tide: Learning About Fair Disciplinary Process from Title IX, 66 J. legal eduC. 822 (2017). Katharine 
Baker shares my focus on the need to change norms to address sexual violence on campus. 
See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Campus Misconduct, Sexual Harm and Appropriate Process: The Essential 
Sexuality of It All, 66 J. legal eduC. 777, 788 (2017) [hereinafter Baker, Campus Misconduct] (“Not 
everyone knows that taking sex without asking is all that wrong.”); see id. at 788 (“[S]tudents 
have not internalized a norm of respect and caution in the sexual context.”).
7. See Carolyn BronsTein, BaTTling pornography: The ameriCan anTi-pornography 
moVemenT 1976-1986 119-25 (2011).  
8. For similar support, see Joseph J. fisChel, sex and harm in The age of ConsenT (2016).
9. See Aya Gruber, Anti-Rape Culture, 64 u. kansas l. reV. 1027 (2015). For important criticisms 
of Title IX processes, see Janet Halley, The Move to Affirmative Consent, 42 signs 257 (2016) and 
Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 128 harV. l. reV. forum 
103 (2015).
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warned against by Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk.10 Unlike these critics, 
though, I am fundamentally supportive of the Obama administration’s Title 
IX enforcement efforts. My criticisms are intended to improve the systems in 
place, not replace them.
Some of my frustrations arose from problems that others have critiqued. 
For example, several aspects of current Title IX compliance processes, such as 
mandatory reporting by professors, strong preferences for formal findings, and 
prohibitions on mediation, take control away from victims of sexual violence. 
Also, I have seen occasional investigation reports that reflect widely held but 
undeniably sexist assumptions about women’s sexuality, such as a report that 
detailed a woman’s behavior with male friends at a sex club but was silent 
on the men’s equally (to me) provocative conduct there. In addition, I am 
not confident that hearing processes created for typical academic misconduct 
(such as plagiarism) using panels of faculty and students are appropriate for 
complaints of sexual violence.11 These concerns, however, are not new, and are 
not my focus here.
My attention is directed to three interrelated concerns with Title IX 
compliance efforts: (a) an overly broad definition of sexual assault; (b) failure to 
deal appropriately with vast variations in attitudes and experiences of sexuality 
of campus women; and (c) resolution processes that ignore the complex web 
of relationships involved in many allegations of Title IX violations. These 
three issues can work together to the detriment of the fundamental fairness 
and safety that are core values underlying the Title IX project.  
My focus on these particular operational issues requires attention to the 
emotional context that surrounds and in some senses controls the policies and 
10. See Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 Cal. l. reV. 881 (2016).
11. The formal hearing processes would have involved faculty or students or both in ways that 
were unlikely to be helpful. See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Why the Campus Rape Crisis Confounds 
Colleges, The naTion (June 23, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-campus-
rape-crisis-confounds-colleges (“In the nationwide controversy over the proper response to 
pervasive sexual assault on college campuses, there is one thing almost everyone agrees 
on: school disciplinary boards have rarely done a very good job of handling these cases. 
That’s partly because these boards were never intended to try serious crimes. Composed 
of faculty, administrators and sometimes students, they were originally created to handle 
honor-code violations like plagiarism and underage drinking. Their members generally 
don’t have training in law, investigation or the use of physical evidence. There are rarely 
hard and fast rules about what sort of information is and isn’t admissible. Yet due to a 
combination of law enforcement failure and federal regulation, they are on the front lines 
of the campus rape crisis . . . .” ); Ross Douthat, Stopping Campus Rape, n.y. Times (June 
29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-stopping-
campus-rape.html?_r=0 (quoting Goldberg article [“. . . [D]ealing with serious crimes in 
a setting that normally handles minor infractions risks a worst-of-both-worlds scenario: a 
process whose lack of professionalism leaves victims more ‘devastated than vindicated,’ even 
as its limited protections for the accused lead to endless lawsuits claiming kangaroo-court 
treatment.”)].
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processes. Specifically, my Title IX work forced me to think seriously about 
shame.12  
The rhetorical justification of Title IX is nondiscrimination, now wrapped 
in a discourse of safety.13 Title IX attempts to redress two serious shame-related 
wrongs: women having been blamed for sexual violence perpetrated against 
them, and some men perpetrating sexual violence with impunity. In some 
ways, then, the compliance and cultural Title IX project is designed to change 
norms14 in profound ways, moving shame from the accusers to the accused, 
from the victim to the perpetrator of sexual violence.15  
Title IX compliance imposes requirements on how campuses address both 
prevention of sexual misconduct and responses to individual complaints. 
The first, prevention efforts, often reflect an awareness of the need to address 
cultures of gendered shame. Reduction in campus sexual violence requires 
some young men to profoundly change their sexual identities and practices. 
They need to become people who would be ashamed of pressuring or forcing 
others sexually, not people who are proud of such sexual conquest. In a sense, 
the core prevention project is to shift shame about sexual activity away from 
women, who may suffer undeserved sexual shame, to men, who may not feel 
shame that is appropriate for sexual violence. The recent presidential campaign 
provides yet another example of how difficult and crucial this consciousness-
raising can be.  
My focus, however, is the second aspect of Title IX compliance, institutional 
responses to complaints. Title IX complaint investigation and adjudication 
operations are also shaped by the shame that may be experienced by 
participants.
I had considered the absence of shame in too many men, but had not 
thought seriously about the excess of shame that haunts too many women. 
I discovered seemingly bottomless pits of shame about sexuality. Young 
women suffer shame from the terrible and unfair vise grip of being perceived 
as not sufficiently sexual (not attractive or “hot”) or as too sexual (“slutty” 
or “easy”) or both. I had understood that women’s pervasive sexual shame 
12. Martha Nussbaum is probably the leading commentator on issues of law and shame. See 
marTha C. nussBaum, hiding from humaniTy: disgusT, shame and The law (2004).
13. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 2 (“The Department is deeply 
concerned about this problem and is committed to ensuring that all students feel safe in 
their school, so that they have the opportunity to benefit fully from the school’s programs 
and activities.”). The Obama White House also emphasized safety for students. See, e.g., 
whiTe house Task forCe To proTeCT sTudenTs from sexual assaulT, noT alone: 
The firsT reporT of The whiTe house Task forCe To proTeCT sTudenTs from sexual 
assaulT (2014), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/905942/download.
14. Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 909 (“[N]orm entrepreneurs [. . .] produce what I will call 
norm bandwagons and norm cascades.”).
15. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape and Shame, 79 B.u. l. reV. 663, 666 (1999) (advocating to 
shame college men and others into seeing unconsented-to sex as a sign of weakness, not 
prowess).  
Shame Agent 
722 Journal of Legal Education
would cause underreporting of violence and discomfort in the investigation 
and adjudication processes. My experience taught me additional, different 
repercussions of the ways that women’s shame can affect Title IX complaint 
procedures.  
Section I discusses the breadth of the category of “sexual assault” approved 
by the OCR and currently in use at MSU and other institutions. Title IX 
procedures to address allegations of sexual violence can and do reach sexual 
misconduct that is much less serious than rape. My experience, thankfully, was 
application of the regulatory enforcement regime to alleged sexual misconduct 
of less violence, less culpability, and less injury than rape. Focus on some of 
these lesser incidents helped me to understand that current definitions of 
sexual assault are too broad.
My second concern, presented in Section II, is that the Title IX sexual-
complaint processes seem to assume that women students’ sexual identities 
are much more uniform than the range of attitudes, approaches, and 
understandings that I saw. Many young women operate within very punishing 
and limiting constructions of their own sexuality. Some young women suffer 
from deep shame from sexual contact, even minor sexual contact. Some women 
experience very little control or autonomy over their own sexuality. This can 
lead to the enforcement regime being activated to vindicate honor, provide 
safety from a third party, reinforce identities of sexual innocence, protect 
against jealousy, or protect young women from falling from someone’s grace. 
It can be a safety net to catch someone from falling from “good” to “slut.” 
Section III presents an argument for a new category of sexual misconduct, 
“sexual infraction.” If current definitions of sexual violence or sexual assault 
are so broad as to capture some conduct that is not easily understood as assault, 
the solution is either to narrow the range of prohibited sexual misconduct 
or explicitly recognize a category of misconduct that is less egregious than 
assault. I pursue the second choice. 
My final concern is the artificial isolation of the complainant and 
respondent in the Title IX adjudication framework. The binary adjudication 
undervalues the social and community context,  including the duties owed 
by the institution to both parties. This is the focus of Section IV, which 
suggests that restorative justice responses could respond more effectively to 
the range of injuries currently being adjudicated, protect the complainant, 
change behaviors of respondents, and use the webs of relationships positively 
to change campus culture more profoundly.
My central frustrations as a Title IX administrator—and as a feminist 
dedicated to reducing sexual violence on campuses—relate to each of these 
issues, and especially to their impact when combined.   
I.  Lesser Sexual Assault 
As a Title IX adjudicator, I was lucky. My experience was investigation 
and informal resolution of multiple allegations of sexual misconduct other 
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than rape. None of the cases I adjudicated involved allegations of penetration. 
None of the cases I dealt with involved physical injury. The cases I dealt 
with were typical in that most involved heavy drinking16 and allegations of 
misconduct by friends or acquaintances. All the cases I dealt with entailed 
heterosexual contact in which women alleged misconduct by men.17 In my 
experience, the regulatory compliance regime put in place for the campus to 
handle sexual violence may be unsuited to lesser incidents.
Consider a hypothetical: A female student leans against a wall. A male 
student leans in to her and kisses her on the mouth.   
What happened? Was this sexual violence in violation of Title IX? Without 
more, we have no way to answer either question. Were they strangers, friends, 
or romantic partners? What interaction preceded the kiss, if any? Were they 
talking to each other?  What did they say? Were they already touching? Was 
it a forceful kiss, or a light one? Was this at a party, or in the law library, or in 
a workplace? This kiss could be anything from a serious crime to an innocent, 
even wonderful moment for both students.
We can fill in the contextual blanks to make my bare-bones hypothetical 
kiss something that sounds easily like sexual assault. Perhaps it came without 
warning between strangers, in a formal or professional setting, effectuated 
through force, or some combination of these factors. Or we can make it 
something that seems nothing like violence or assault. Perhaps the two students 
were in a romantic relationship, were already touching, were at a party, had 
just danced together, or some of this together. The injury of the contact could 
be large, nonexistent, or something in between. It could be apparently small 
to many observers, but large to the woman kissed. Context is required to 
determine whether injury and culpability exist and, if so, to what degree. But 
the broader context may matter surprisingly little in the Title IX investigation 
as to whether a prohibited sexual assault occurred. 
16. See, e.g., Justin R. Garcia et al., Sexual Hookup Culture: A Review, 16 reV. gen. psyChol. 161, 
168-69 (2012) (prevalence of alcohol use with “unintentional” sex); id. at 169 (“Alcohol may 
also serve as an excuse, purposely consumed as a strategy to protect the self from having 
to justify hookup behavior later” (citation omitted); Heidi A. Lyons, Wendy D. Manning, 
Monica A. Longmore & Peggy C. Giordano, Young Adult Casual Sexual Behavior: Life-Course-
Specific Motivations and Consequences, 57 soC. persp. 79, 81 (2014) (casual sex—vaginal intercourse 
outside of a committed relationship—is prevalent among college students and is highly 
related to alcohol use); miCh. sTaTe uniV., uniVersiTy poliCy on relaTionship ViolenCe 
and sexual misConduCT [hereinafter MSU RVSM poliCy] at 13, https://www.hr.msu.edu/
policies-procedures/university-wide/documents/RVSMPolicy.pdf (“Being intoxicated or 
impaired by drugs or alcohol is never an excuse for misconduct and does not diminish one’s 
responsibility to obtain consent.”).
17. Following my experience, I will refer to complainants as women and respondents as 
men, understanding that this configuration is typical, but not universal. My ease with 
this oversimplification probably reflects my second-wave feminist roots. See Sara Carrigan 
Wooten, Heterosexist Discourse: How Feminist Theory Shaped Campus Sexual Violence Policy, in The 
Crisis of Campus sexual ViolenCe: CriTiCal perspeCTiVes on preVenTion and response, 
supra note 1, at 33 (explaining prevalent Title IX construction of rape as perpetrated by men 
against women as grounded in second-wave feminism).
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As is typical when sex and law collide, consent is the crucial issue. The 
Department of Justice has told us that “[s]exual assault is any type of sexual 
contact or behavior that occurs without the explicit consent of the recipient.”18 
MSU policies define “sexual violence” as “a physical sexual act perpetrated 
without consent.”19 MSU’s definition of “sexual assault” includes “having 
sexual contact with another individual by force or threat of force; without 
consent; or where that person is incapacitated.”20 
Not surprisingly, the terms of MSU policies follow the common 
understanding that a kiss on the lips is sexual contact. “Sexual contact” 
includes “intentional contact with the intimate parts of another” “without 
permission.”21 “Intimate parts of another” include the “mouth.”22 For MSU 
students, unless consented to, a kiss on the lips is sexual assault. A Title IX 
sexual assault determination will turn on specific and somewhat constrained 
evidence of whether consent existed for that particular sexual contact, that 
particular kiss.  
Thoughtful feminists have warned for decades that the concept of consent 
cannot bear all the weight we give it.23 Consent suggests autonomous people 
on a level playing field who know what they want and are able to express it. 
Sexual consent interactions are shaped by highly gendered preexisting power 
dynamics and social expectations, both conscious and unconscious. Plus, 
of course, sexual desire is inherently mysterious. As Judith Butler noted in 
questioning the groundbreaking Antioch College affirmative-consent rules, 
“we expect knowingness precisely at those moments when unknowingness 
18. u.s. dep’T of JusTiCe, offiCe on ViolenCe againsT women, areas of foCus: sexual 
assaulT, https://www.justice.gov/ovw/sexual-assault (last visited June 6, 2017). According 
to the Office for Civil Rights’s Dear Colleague Letter, “sexual violence” includes “physical 
sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will,” and “Sexual harassment of students, which 
includes acts of sexual violence, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX.” 
Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 1. “A number of different acts 
fall into the category of sexual violence, including rape, sexual assault, sexual battery, and 
sexual coercion. All such acts of sexual violence are forms of sexual harassment covered 
under Title IX.” Id., at 1-2.  
19. MSU RVSM poliCy, supra note 16, at 10.   
20. Id. (emphasis added).  
21. Id.   
22. Id.   
23. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 s. Cal. 
l. reV. 777, 780-84, 814-18, 820-26, 835-38, 841-42 (1988) (choosing to use “mutual” instead 
of “consensual” because consent is so fraught in a world of strongly different power and 
different roles); william n. eskridge, Jr. & nan d. hunTer, sexualiTy, gender, and The 
law 1239-40, 1260 (2d ed. 2006) (challenging whether “consent” is, can be, or should be 
“the main arbiter of the legality of sexual activity”); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s 
Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 wis. women’s l.J. 81, 94 (1987) 
(“[W]omen define themselves as ‘giving selves’ so as to obviate the threat, the danger, the 
pain, and the fear of being self-regarding selves from whom their sexuality is taken.”).
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is inseparable from sexuality.”24 In sexualized encounters, our emotions 
may run amok, complicating our always-limited powers of observation and 
understanding. And sexual novices are the least promising candidates for 
clarity and direct communication about sexual desire. Beyond all that, at a 
practical level, proving what happened in any private dispute between two 
people—whether agreeing on a price for a car or agreeing to have sex—is not 
easy. Consent is fraught politically,  conceptually,  and practically. But however 
flimsy consent is as the dividing line between violation or no violation, it is the 
best (and only) demarcation we have. Therefore, our pressing job is to address 
and reduce the potential unfairness in determining whether consent existed.    
Like those of many others, MSU’s policies attempt to limit the potential 
problems in consent determinations in two ways: first, by requiring evidence 
of unambiguous agreement; and second, by constraining what evidence 
adequately establishes consent. For too many years and in too many situations, 
consent to sex by women has been assumed or not thought necessary. MSU 
policy addresses these unbalanced assumptions by requiring evidence of 
“voluntary, willful, and unambiguous agreement” to establish consent.25 This 
staunch requirement is justified in a world where too many men are ready to 
assume consent when faced with silence, reluctance, or even refusal.  
Similarly, contrary to long-standing attitudes, being in a sexual relationship 
does not or at least should not itself create blanket permission for sex. 
Enduring attitudes that women in sexual relationships give up their ability 
to withhold consent justifies an explicit policy, such as MSU’s, that “prior 
consent does not imply current consent or future consent; even in the context 
of a prior or current relationship, consent must be sought and freely given for 
each instance of sexual contact.”26 The political and social context requires 
these evidentiary limitations to counter biased and misogynistic supposed 
common sense. But, at the same time, these policy specifics reduce the saliency 
of the broader context, and make clear expression of consent determinative.  
24. Judith Butler, Sexual Consent: Some Thoughts on Psychoanalysis and Law, 21 Colum. J. gender & l. 
3, 25 (2011-2012). More fully:
If making oneself available to the unknown is part of sexual probing, sexual 
exploration, then none of us starts as fully self-conscious, deliberate, and autonomous 
individuals when we consent. How do we understand this not knowing as not only 
part of any sexual formation, but as a continuing risk of sexual encounter, even as part 
of its allure?
Id. at 21.  
25. MSU RVSM poliCy, supra note 16, at 11. Policies at many other universities define consent 
similarly. See, e.g., the uniV. of miChigan, poliCy and proCedures on sTudenT sexual and 
gender-Based misConduCT and oTher forms of inTerpersonal ViolenCe (July 1, 2016), 
https://studentsexualmisconductpolicy.umich.edu/files/smp/SSMP-FINAL-062916.pdf. 
26. MSU RVSM poliCy, supra note 16, at 12. The MSU policy does not require unambiguous 
verbal consent, and in that way is not the most stringent possible. But the policy cautions 
that reliance on nonverbal communication causes the risk of mistake about consent. Id. at 
12. Unless and until this warning is known and well-understood by students, this aspect of 
the policy is likely to surprise many of them.
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Returning to my hypothetical kiss, almost independent of any other aspect 
of the context, without evidence that the woman unambiguously consented, 
this kiss is sexual assault in violation of Title IX.  
If we stipulate that consent for the kiss was not given, we know it 
constituted sexual assault under the policy, but we still do not know much 
else. Even without consent, the injury could vary widely, ranging from serious 
criminal activity to a minor, forgettable incident. For example, even if the 
two students were married or otherwise in a committed sexual relationship, 
she may not have consented to that particular kiss for any one of countless 
reasons, including distraction, annoyance, modesty, or a headache. Or maybe 
the two were friends at a party who had been dancing, drinking, and talking 
together in a flirtatious way, but the kiss was a misstep.  
In many situations like this, when evidence of affirmative consent is missing 
and the kiss is in fact unwelcome, the woman kissed would turn away and stop 
the kiss. In the scenarios I suggested, she probably would not even consider 
making a complaint. For most kisses that constitute sexual assault, the Title 
IX enforcement mechanism is not set in motion. Many women are reluctant 
to pursue complaints about rape, let alone a relatively minor kiss. The woman 
would not consider herself seriously injured, and would not want to waste her 
time.  
But if such a complaint is pursued, an unconsented-to kiss will result in 
a finding of sexual assault. Even if the evidence of consent is contested and 
ambiguous, two aspects of the Title IX compliance regime make it likely that, 
if a complaint is pursued, a finding of sexual violence, specifically sexual 
assault, is likely. As discussed above, stringent evidence of consent is required. 
Also, using the preponderance-of-the-evidence  standard, a finding of sexual 
assault can be found even in a very close case. Most of the critical commentary 
about the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard required by the 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter questions the fairness of adjudicating serious criminal 
conduct with this  forgiving standard of proof.27 I am suggesting that the 
preponderance standard may lead to unjust results following complaints of 
much less serious sexual misconduct, such as an unconsented-to kiss.
But why would anyone pursue a formal complaint about a nonforceful but 
unwanted first kiss? Perhaps the possibility seems far-fetched, but it may not 
be.  
II.  Shame Agent
My terrible disappointment from the Title IX work was discovering that too 
many highly accomplished women students suffer from sexual identities that 
are painfully constrained, fearful, and fraught with potential shame. I learned 
27. E.g., Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice, 26 am. prospeCT 32 (2015) (preponderance standard 
wrong in part because these proceedings do not include discovery and offer less than full 
civil procedural protections).
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from listening to women with Title IX complaints that the sexual freedom I 
imagined for them is too often illusory. 
At least somewhat aware of the “hookup culture” on campuses, I 
misinterpreted what it meant. I imagined that the fact that many women 
students engage in casual sex reflects widespread comfort with sexuality 
and confidence in seeking sexual pleasure.28 Impressed by the “slutwalk” 
demonstrations, I envisioned that a slutwalk protestor holding a sign declaring 
“It’s my hot body/ I do what I want”29 represents the sexual freedom and 
even refreshing sexual swagger of women students. I somehow even allowed 
myself to be misled by the almost ubiquitous fashion choices of many younger 
women, foolishly associating low-cut tops, high heels, or tight clothes with 
comfortable sexual freedom. The intimate details of Title IX investigations 
revealed a very different reality for some students. 
We should not be surprised that I was operating from many false ideas 
about women students’ sexual identities and attitudes. My personal experience 
as a heterosexual college student was about fifty years ago, and happened to 
be at a particular time of sexual liberation and freedom. Then I came out 
as a lesbian forty years ago, at a time when that constituted defiance toward 
and disregard of well-entrenched attitudes and laws about so-called sexual 
deviancy. I have taught Gender and the Law and Sexual Orientation and 
the Law many times, at multiple law schools, starting in the 1990s, but I now 
understand that the self-selection into those classes probably gave me a false 
sense of understanding students’ sexual worlds.   
Like most of the students in my feminist and sexuality classes, my own 
experience is that sexual attraction, arousal, and desire are very complicated, 
not particularly static, and often unpredictable. I do not believe in some 
immutable separation between friendship and attraction. I do not believe in 
being ashamed for having strange, unwelcome, inappropriate, messy sexual 
thoughts.30 I do not agree that a sexual practice based on explicit, verbal cues 
prior to all sexual contact is the best sexual realm,31 and I am distrustful of easy 
constructions of healthy or unhealthy sex. For me, sexual transgression can be 
28. For more accurate and troubling accounts, see kaThleen a. Bogle, hooking up: sex, 
daTing, and relaTionships on Campus (2008) and lisa wade, ameriCan hookup: The 
new CulTure of sex on Campus (2017).  
29. For a photograph of such a protestor holding this sign in a 2011 Boston SlutWalk, see 
kaiTlynn mendes, sluTwalk: feminism, aCTiVism and media 121 (2015).  
30. Similarly, see Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 
Colum. l. reV. 181, 207 (2001) (“Desire is not subject to cleaning up, to being purged of its 
nasty, messy, perilous dimensions, full of contradictions and the complexities of simultaneous 
longing and denial. It is precisely the proximity to danger, the lure of prohibition, the seamy 
side of shame that creates the heat that draws us toward our desires, and that makes desire 
and pleasure so resistant to rational explanation.”) 
31. Id. at 206-07 (“[T]o evacuate women’s sexuality of any risk of a confrontation with shame, 
loss of control, or objectification strikes me as selling women a sanitized, meager simulacrum 
of sex not worth getting riled up about in any case.”); Gersen & Suk, supra note 10 (discussing 
the kind of sex that sex bureaucrats are enforcing). 
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positive.32 I am hostile to notions of sexual ownership, such as, for example, 
the attitude that kissing or being kissed violates the kissed woman’s boyfriend, 
fiancé, or husband. I discovered that some of our students hold these attitudes. 
I probably was also misled by the apparent ease of students, no matter their 
background, with the reality of an openly lesbian dean. Surely that translated 
into some core appreciation of sexual freedom for themselves? I was wrong. 
I was truly surprised to learn that some current women students hold very 
traditional ideas about women’s sexuality. The ageless pressure on young 
women not to be perceived as too sexually active is very much alive and much 
stronger than I had realized.  
Young women walk reputational tightropes. They deal with social pressure 
to appear super-comfortable with sexuality, plus the contrary pressure to not 
be “too” sexually active. Casual sex on campus happens more than ever before, 
but university communities also include many women who are attempting to 
be quite strict about their sexual activity. Young people are highly reactive to 
perceptions of peer expectations and norms, but their understanding of those 
norms is often wrong.33  
Even young women who are sophisticated about feminist ideas often see 
their own experiences through lenses of shame.34 Even happily sexually active 
women may operate within intense prohibitions about their sexual identities 
and be vulnerable to slut-shaming.35 More traditional women may face even 
more pressure.  
Judgments of promiscuousness (“slut-shaming”) are not evenly distributed 
or evenly harmful. A recent study of college women at a large Midwest 
university found that slut discourse was ubiquitous and that “[w]omen’s 
32. Franke, supra note 30, at 207 (“It is precisely the proximity to danger, the lure of prohibition, 
the seamy side of shame that creates the heat that draws us toward our desires, and that 
makes desire and pleasure so resistant to rational explanation. It is also what makes pleasure, 
not a contradiction of or haven from danger, but rather a close relation.”).
33. See Annika M. Johnson & Stephanie M. Hoover, The Potential of Sexual Consent Interventions on 
College Campuses: A Literature Review on the Barriers to Establishing Affirmative Sexual Consent, 4 PURE 
InsIghts 1 (2015), http://digitalcommons.wou.edu/pure/vol4/iss1/5.
34. See lynn m. phillips, flirTing wiTh danger: young women’s refleCTions on sexualiTy 
and dominaTion (2000) (noting that college women in this study who were sophisticated 
about feminist ideas still had difficulty naming what happened to them as sexual assault 
or something not their fault; they too suffered lots of shame and difficulty navigating the 
elusive goal of sexual pleasure).  
35. For example, a recent study of white, primarily heterosexual university women revealed that 
the label “slut” was actively deployed to establish status among the women, although often it 
was divorced from actual sexual conduct. High-status women were able to be sexually active 
without being at risk of being understood to be sluts. Higher- and lower-status women 
differentiated the other group in part by calling them sluts. See Elizabeth A. Armstrong, 
Laura T. Hamilton, Elizabeth M. Armstrong & J. Lotus Seeley, ‘Good Girls’: Gender, Social Class, 
and Slut Discourse on Campus, 77 soC. psyChol. Q. 100 (2014). The authors found that “[s]lut 
discourse was ubiquitous among the women … studied.” Id. at 117. 
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definitions of sluttiness revolve around status on campus, which is largely 
dictated by class background.”36 More specifically:
High-status women employ slut discourse to assert class advantage, defining 
their styles of femininity and approaches to sexuality as classy rather than 
trashy. Low-status women express class resentment—deriding rich, bitchy sluts 
for their wealth, exclusivity, and participation in casual sexual activity. For 
high-status women—whose definitions prevail in the dominant social scene—
slut discourse enables, rather than constrains, sexual experimentation. In 
contrast, low-status women are vulnerable to public shaming.37
This is an unforgiving world, in which the serious stigma from a reputation for 
being “easy” is often not based on actual sexual activity.38  
Many women students continue to be subjected to intense pressure to 
maintain a character or identity of sexual innocence and purity. For some, the 
protection against sexual shame is fragile and very thin. Some navigate safety 
and comfort by finding protection in a sexual relationship, sometimes even 
considering themselves the sexual property of a boyfriend, fiancé, or husband. 
Some may have a very traditional understanding of their sexuality, based on 
cultural, religious, or other values. This range of attitudes and experiences 
interacts with Title IX sexual misconduct enforcement processes.  
Some women’s capacity for shame in a sexual encounter is very broad, and 
can be rooted in a sexual morality that provides very little room for sexual 
ambiguities. Some accomplished, smart, sophisticated women have sexual 
identities and moralities that are very different from what I imagined. I want 
Title IX work to affirm women’s sexual agency, desire, and safety, but it may 
also be activated to defend women’s honor.  
My purpose here is not to judge more traditional understandings of one’s 
sexuality. We celebrate the diversity of our student bodies, and that includes 
religious, political, and cultural diversity that inevitably includes wide 
variations in sexual behavior and attitudes. But some of the Title IX definitions 
and processes seem to be based on mistakes about women’s sexuality very 
much like mine.
When combined with the expansive definition of sexual assault, the Title 
IX consent policies seem to assume a complainant who is confident and 
secure in her sexual identity, clear about her experiences, and unhampered by 
confusion or shame. In short, the processes seem to share the naiveté that I 
brought to this work.  
36. Id. at 101.
37. Id.
38. “The slut label may have little or nothing to do with the kind or amount of sex women 
have.” Id. at 103; see also Patricia J. Williams, On Imperfection and Its Comforts, signs, http://
signsjournal.org/bad-feminist/#williams (last visited June 6, 2017) (reviewing Roxanne 
Gay’s Bad feminisT) (“Gay speaks to the mean-spirited perfectionism that so many young 
women must deal with today.”).
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Some women are caught between relatively permissive campus sexual 
culture and strict family, cultural, or religious prohibitions. Most disturbingly, 
some women, even today, understand their sexuality as something that is 
owed to men to whom they must be loyal. In those cases, women’s own safety 
could be at risk from any kind of flirtatious behavior, let alone being kissed, 
or kissing. These women may need to defend their honor and innocence in 
the context of relationships with fiancés or boyfriends or husbands. At the 
worst, the entire compliance regime could be defending the property rights of 
a boyfriend or fiancé. 
Women have many reasons to avoid reporting sexual violence and 
misconduct that they suffer, including lack of confidence in the processes, 
desire not to cause harm to themselves or someone they know, and privacy 
concerns. The importance and precariousness of their sexual reputations may 
play a role. Debilitating sexual shame and associated reputational risks are 
prime reasons that women choose not to report even serious sexual violence. 
This massive underreporting of sexual violence is the larger problem. But the 
importance and precariousness of women’s sexual reputations may also cause 
what may seem to others like overreporting. Some complainants may have 
complicated pressures to exaggerate the harm that they suffered, substitute 
certainty for uncertainty about exactly what happened, or pursue serious 
penalties for conduct that may not be considered serious to others. Unpleasant 
and unwelcome as this reality may be, we should recognize it.
The expansive formal definition of sexual assault interacts with this diversity 
of sexual attitudes held by our students. Some women may suffer or perceive 
themselves to suffer serious harm from what seems to others a trivial incident. 
Some students may have intense pressure to use the system to establish their 
sexual innocence, after even a relatively minor incident. What if earnest, 
honest complainants could use the enforcement and protection apparatus to 
simplify and clean up messy sexual realities, protecting themselves (perhaps 
even establishing their safety) by solidifying their identity as sexually innocent, 
pure, passive, or clean? Sexual shame may lead to formal complaints about 
relatively minor incidents.  
In various scenarios, for women who are conservative sexually, whether for 
religious or other cultural reasons, or for any reason, an unwanted kiss from 
a close friend after dancing at a party, for example, could be very upsetting. 
It could even be dangerous. And she could have very serious reasons to want 
to establish as convincingly as possible that she did nothing to elicit that kiss.
Most women subjected to an unwanted kiss will reject it without recourse 
to formal procedures. Most women who are not sure whether they consented 
to a kiss will not initiate formal procedures. But some will. Perhaps ironically, 
this may become more common as campus culture improves by making the 
availability of formal complaint procedures much more widely understood.  
“We believe you” advocacy campaigns are powerful and appropriate 
in a world in which women are routinely ridiculed and not believed when 
731
complaining about sexual violence. In the context of long-standing impunity 
for sexual violence by young men, Title IX compliance regimes correctly are 
attempting to level the field for women suffering from this conduct. But “we 
believe you” does not translate fairly into individual adjudications.  
Taking seriously the continuing pressures that young women face related 
to their sexuality means also taking seriously pressures that some women may 
face to understand the encounter in ways that maximize their surprise at the 
unwanted sexual contact. Not only does this sexual diversity of our students 
mean that relatively minor complaints may be brought, but it also means that 
the complainant may have deep self-interest to understand or interpret the 
context to diminish any role in suggesting consent. To not be considered a 
slut, a disloyal girlfriend or fiancée, or a “tease” can be very important, perhaps 
crucial, for a young woman’s identity and well-being. These pressures can turn 
memories of an ambiguous event into something more clear-cut, and more 
obviously injurious.
Cognitive biases are real. Certainty about exactly what happened may be 
grounded in the importance of that version to self-esteem, safety, deeply held 
notions of identity, and worthiness, as much as anything else. The Title IX 
educational project is intended to teach young men (in particular, but not 
exclusively) that their self-interested perception about sexual advances being 
welcome may be wrong. Young women also bring self-interested perceptions 
into their understanding of sexual encounters. We all do.  
And nothing suggests that fighting off powerful feelings of shame adds to 
the accuracy of one’s memory.39 Indeed, cultural theorists write convincingly 
about the way that shame may operate: “[S]hame betrays a proclivity for 
seeking distance between a shamed subject and an other, onto whom shame 
becomes projected.”40 I do not want any women to feel deep shame for 
sexual contact that they let themselves experience, or even that they sought. 
But acknowledging that some do feel that shame, and that the enforcement 
apparatus may help them to even unknowingly transfer it to another, is an 
important caution.
39. Sally R. Munt, Queer aTTaChmenTs: The CulTural poliTiCs of shame (2008) at xiv 
(Foreword by Donald L. Nathanson, M.D.) (The shame effect, “the basic physiological 
mechanism underlying the experience we feel as shame, is triggered when we’re interrupted 
whilst thinking/feeling/doing something pleasant. The associated period of blush, cognitive 
shock, incoherence, and confusion lasts only moments until we seek freedom from this 
discomfort through the compass of interpersonal maneouvers I’ve described as withdrawal, 
submission, distraction, or attack on whomever we deem responsible for our discomfort.”).
40. Clara Fischer, Gender, Nation, and the Politics of Shame: Magdalen Laundries and the Institutionalisation of 
Feminine Transgression in Modern Ireland, 41 signs 821, 835 (2016), referencing miChael warner, 
The TrouBle wiTh normal: sex, poliTiCs and The eThiCs of Queer life (1999). “A 
ranking of shamed others thus creates a chain along which shame travels to establish more 
or less deviant subjects. This produces competition, envy, and a jostling for position among 
those willing and able to compete for a higher place in the hierarchy. Of course it also 
affords the opportunity for manipulation by those in top position, as the reward of upward 
progression can be used as currency.” Id.
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A woman’s shame and vulnerability can influence not only the decision to 
pursue a complaint and the memories related to consent, it can also influence 
remedies sought and obtained. Especially in the negotiations of an informal 
resolution, the remedial apparatus may be shaped in part by the desire or 
need of the complainant to establish her innocence or minimize her shame 
or dishonor. The apparatus of safety—removal from the same classes, removal 
from the dorm—also carries with it an expressive function, especially when 
social circles of the complainant and respondent overlap. Those remedial 
measures may function to the complainant as evidence of the vindication 
of the correctness of her interpretation of the incident. The vehemence of 
insistence on a particular sequence of events, or interpretation of events, for 
all of us, may be based as much on the importance to us of that interpretation 
as on its accuracy.
The difficulty of proof of sexual consent and the morass of conflicting 
pressures facing the students involved are not sufficient reasons to give up 
the effort. But they are reasons to be sure that the categories of offense are 
accurate and proportionate to the injury or culpability. Students who 
attempt understandable but mistaken kisses should not be so easily found 
responsible for sexual assault.  
III.  Sexual Infraction
The simplest way to correct the overly broad category of sexual assault is 
to create a new category of sexual misconduct, which could be called “sexual 
infraction.” The unfairness of holding someone responsible for misperceiving 
consent for lesser sexual contact can be mitigated by creating this category of 
lesser offense.
An alternative approach would be to narrow consent requirements by 
requiring a showing of consent for most, but not all, sexual contact. In other 
words, consent would not be required for some category of lesser sexual 
contacts. But imperfect as it surely is, the current across-the-board requirement 
of affirmative consent for all sexual contact has the great virtue of simplicity. 
The bright-line requirement of consent before any sexual contact is a clumsy 
but highly effective, pragmatic tactic in the massive consciousness-raising 
project of educating young men and women not to engage in unwanted 
sexual conduct. The simplicity of this message is a crucial advantage in the 
educational effort to reduce or eliminate campus sexual violence.
The investigation and adjudication processes could also be harmed by 
creating a category of sexual contact for which unambiguous consent is not 
required. Carving out such a category would create a new and massive incentive 
for accused students to fit their conduct into that category in order to absolve 
themselves completely. A better approach is adoption of a new category of 
lesser sexual misconduct, “sexual infraction.”
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Sexual infraction41 could consist of nonconsensual sexual contact with 
someone known to you without coercion, penetration, or touching intimate 
portions of the body other than the lips.42 This new “lesser included” offense 
has the benefit of more fairly and accurately describing a large category of 
sexual contact that currently would be pursued as sexual assault.  
Infraction43 as a new category of sexual misconduct has the significant 
advantage of proportionality. Especially with initial contact such as a 
kiss, mistakes about consent are entirely predictable. Realistically, many 
welcome first kisses have occurred without explicit, unambiguous consent. 
The university’s stringent, OCR-approved consent requirement reflects the 
aspiration for a highly communicative sexual practice that is unlikely to 
be prevalent. Especially because they are relatively inexperienced in sexual 
behavior, many students do not communicate well with sexual partners.44 Like 
people of any age, many young adults are uncomfortable talking about sex, 
and use indirect communication rather than direct consent. Sexual scripts 
differ between various communities represented on our diverse campuses.45 
We should not have policies that too easily permit language, national origin, 
or cultural differences to result in findings of sexual assault. 
These are important and difficult cautions for affirmative-consent 
requirements, consent evidentiary limitations, and the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard. But each also brings important advantages. The grip of 
41. I am indebted to the Journal of legal eduCaTion editors for the suggestion that “sexual 
infraction” replace the label “sexual mistake” that I used originally. Some participants at 
the Boyd School of Law discussion of this paper suggested the even flatter label, “sexual 
incident,” either to replace “sexual infraction” or as part of a three-tiered approach. 
42. The category’s definition requires choices regarding intent, type of relationship, and specific 
contact covered. I am following current policy in avoiding any intent language, leaving it as 
a type of strict liability. A “person known to you” covers the most obvious scenarios I have 
discussed, but could also include troubling categories of employers or professors unless 
language is added excluding those relationships. Other lesser contact could be added, 
including contact with clothed breasts, for example. Some campus policies do not include 
oral contact as “sexual contact” unless it is oral-genital contact.  See, e.g., u. of miCh., poliCy 
& proCedures on sTudenT sexual & gender-Based misConduCT & oTher forms of 
inTerpersonal ViolenCe: prohiBiTed ConduCT, https://studentsexualmisconductpolicy.
umich.edu/content/prohibited-conduct (last visited June 7, 2017). But unwelcome kisses 
may in fact constitute sexual assault, a strong justification for including them explicitly in 
campus policies on sexual misconduct.  
43. As suggested by Lydia Nussbaum, labeling this an “infraction” rather than a “sexual 
infraction” would flatten the rhetorical charge of the offense. It could also be called an 
“intimacy violation” or an “intimacy infraction.”
44. See Johnson & Hoover, supra note 33, at *4 (“Young adults tend to avoid direct conversations 
regarding sexual consent when possible and rely on nonverbal passive approaches to avoid 
embarrassment.”); see id. (“Heterosexual young adults often do not engage in verbal or direct 
methods when establishing sexual consent.”). 
45. Id. at *6 (“Sexual scripts are social phenomenon [sic] that may differ based on the gender, 
race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and class of the young adults.”). 
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sexual conquest as an element of masculinity is so strong46 that I am willing 
to support blunt tactics, such as requirements of affirmative consent, as 
a corrective. I accept their value as highly pragmatic tactics in a crucially 
important norm-shifting legal, cultural, and regulatory project.  
But mistakes about consent are especially possible in the initial stages of 
sexual contact, such as a kiss (“first base”). Unconsented-to vaginal or anal 
penetration is usually something qualitatively different from unconsented-to 
sexual touching of the mouth. The consent evidentiary requirements work 
well in the context of unconsented-to intercourse, disrobing, or other similarly 
serious sexual contact. Aside from the greater intimacy of sexual intercourse, 
it typically takes more time to get there. A surprise kiss is often welcome. 
Surprise genital contact generally is not.
Enforcement mechanisms can be structured so that adjudicatory outcomes 
are proportionate to the offense. A finding of “sexual assault” for failing to 
obtain unambiguous evidence of consent to a kiss is not proportionate.  
Every dispute system results in errors, no matter the standard of proof or its 
evidentiary rules. Errors from the combination of the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard and the affirmative-consent requirements can predictably 
fall on accused students. Academic communities must be mindful of the 
potential unfairness to students from these rules, and work diligently to 
reduce the risk of such errors. For example, the university can reduce the risk 
of mistakes in complaint adjudications through relentless education of the 
entire campus community about university policies and the serious risks from 
engaging in sexual activity without express consent. If the policy says that 
evidence of prior consent is not determinative, for example, it is important 
for every student, male and female, to understand that before a dispute arises. 
Drawing lines is difficult, but possible. Just as drunk-driving prohibitions 
based on blood alcohol levels penalize some people who are not impaired,47 
requirements of affirmative evidence of consent ensnare some people who 
sincerely believed that they had consent. But the reasonableness of that belief 
is likely to be limited to less intimate sexual contact. And an accused found 
responsible for a “sexual infraction” is facing a much less serious judgment 
and less stigma.  
Equally important, a finding of sexual infraction based on mistake about 
consent would be likely to justify a different, lesser remedial response. This 
matters for both interim and permanent remedies. An allegation of sexual 
assault supports more aggressive measures, including immediate removal 
from a dorm or from classes shared with the complainant. The lesser finding 
of sexual infraction could vindicate the complainant’s understanding of what 
happened without imposing the greater level of penalty on the accused that 
46. For a compelling description of the powerful culture of masculinity of many young men, see 
miChael kimmel, guyland: The perilous world where Boys BeCome men (2008).   
47. See Baker, Campus Misconduct, supra note 6, at 788-92 (discussing norms against drunk driving 
and impact of offense based on blood alcohol, not impairment).  
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is understood to be necessary to protect a complainant from a perpetrator 
or possible perpetrator of sexual assault. Most important, proportionality is 
required for fairness. Unfair processes breed resentment, and resentment slows 
or even reverses the norm cascade that can and should create safer campuses.48
IV.  RElatIonal REmEdIEs: tURnIng towaRd REstoRatIvE JUstIcE 
The incidents underlying the Title IX matters I worked on were highly 
social, but the processes and remedies artificially isolated the accuser and the 
accused. Some of this is inevitable, given that the complained-of acts themselves 
are highly personal, usually intimate. Certainly the stakes are highest for the 
accuser and the accused. But adjudication processes should not artificially 
isolate the two main participants. The fundamental rationale underlying Title 
IX processes is the institution’s obligation to provide a nondiscriminatory and 
safe learning environment to all students. That principle is inherently social 
and relational. It also highlights the institution’s ongoing relationship with 
and obligations to both the accuser and the accused. Indeed, although the 
processes focus very much on the (usually) two central participants, the action 
is formally taken by the educational institution, as part of its obligation to 
create and maintain an effective educational environment.
Also, the underlying incidents that precipitate a complaint often occur in 
a social setting, such as at or on the periphery of a party. Most crucially, the 
incident and its aftermath usually have ramifications for wide social circles. It 
may involve friendship networks, often overlapping, of the accuser and the 
accused. The accuser and accused might both be law students, or live in the 
same dorm. The accused could be a friend of the accuser, or of her boyfriend, 
or of her friends. Complex webs of loyalty surround both students. Friends 
can be pulled in as witnesses, or may attempt to insert themselves on one side 
or another. A boyfriend can attempt to insert himself. The community suffers 
an injury.  
Current complaint investigation and adjudication compliance regimes 
do not sufficiently recognize the complexities of the relationships between 
the two and among their friendship circles. Nor does an adversarial process 
adequately account for the ongoing duties owed by the university to both 
central figures and many others. Isolating the two key participants also fails 
to acknowledge the meaning and impact that the complaint may have on 
the complainant’s relationships to others with whom she is close, and in the 
respondent’s relationships. 
These observations bring me back to restorative justice.49 Restorative justice 
methods recognize the institution’s responsibilities to all students involved. 
48. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 831 (“Over time, fair procedures should lead to greater community 
faith in campus discipline, allowing colleges to take the steps necessary to build safe and 
just campuses.”). Proportionate categories of misconduct are an important aspect of fair 
procedures.  
49. See Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restorative Justice Critique of Anti-Gang 
Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 hasTings ConsT. l. Q. 717 (2000).
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Restorative justice models hold the accused accountable for the harm he has 
caused, but acknowledge that both accuser and accused are members of the 
community. According to John Braithwaite, a leading figure in the restorative 
justice movement, the core values of restorative justice are “about healing 
rather than hurting, moral learning, community participation and community 
caring, respectful dialogue, forgiveness, responsibility, apology, and making 
amends.”50 Restorative justice processes can use shame productively by treating 
the offender with genuine respect.51
I am not the only one to appreciate and support the potential of restorative 
justice processes to address campus sexual misconduct.52 In her important 
recent article, Crime Logic,  Campus Sexual Assault,  and Restorative  Justice,53 Professor 
Donna Coker argues compellingly that current Title IX processes suffer 
from being conceptualized within our dominant framework for addressing 
criminal behavior, in what Professor Coker calls  “Crime Logic.”54 Professor 
Coker advocates for a public health approach, and recommends what she 
calls “Transformative RJ [Restorative Justice]”, meaning restorative justice 
models that use insights from critical feminist and critical race theories, 
particularly those related to intersectionality and structural inequality.55 
“A Transformative RJ [Restorative Justice] model attends to the impact of 
intersecting subordination both in the life of the person who committed harm 
50. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 Crime & JusT. 
1, 6 (1999). Braithwaite has described restorative justice responses to crime as “a process of 
bringing together the individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them 
agree on how to repair the harm caused by the crime. The purpose is to restore victims, 
restore offenders, and restore communities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just.” 
John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 
1727, 1743 (1999).
51. See John BraiThwaiTe, Crime, shame and reinTegraTion (1989). 
52. For others making the same suggestion, see Alletta Brenner, Transforming Campus Culture to 
Prevent rape: The Possibility and Promise of Restorative Justice as a Response to Campus Sexual Violence, 
harV. J. l. & gender (Oct. 6, 2013), http://harvardjlg.com/2013/10/transforming-campus-
culture-to-prevent-rape-the-possibility-and-promise-of-restorative-justice-as-a-response-to-
campus-sexual-violence; Rebecca Ropers-Huilman, Kaaren M. Williamsen & Garrett Drew 
Hoffman, Afterword: Questioning the Scripts of Sexual Misconduct, in The Crisis of Campus sexual 
ViolenCe: CriTiCal perspeCTiVes on preVenTion and response, supra note 1, at 185, 187 
(urging restorative justice to “facilitate healing, behavior change, and true accountability”); 
Mary P. Koss, Jay K. Wilgus & Kaaren Williamsen, Campus Sexual Misconduct: Restorative Justice 
Approaches to Enhance Compliance with Title IX Guidance, 15 Trauma, ViolenCe, & aBuse 242 (2014).
53. Donna Coker, Crime Logic, Campus Sexual Assault, and Restorative Justice, 49 Texas TeCh l. reV. 
147 (2016). 
54. Id. at 150. “Crime Logic is reflected in (1) a focus on individual culpability rather than 
on collective accountability; (2) a disdain for policy attention to social determinants of 
behavior; (3) a preference for narratives that center on bad actors and innocent victims; and 
(4) a preference for removing individuals who have harmed others as though excising an 
invasive cancer from the body politic.” Id. 
55. Id. at 197-99.  
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as well as in the life of the person who was harmed.”56 This approach is deeply 
appropriate in light of the university’s ongoing duties to all of its students, 
including the accuser and the accused. 
Restorative justice processes should allow the accuser to articulate the 
seriousness of her experience of violation and injury. Rather than turning 
entirely on a binary question of consent or no consent, it can allow for a much 
more nuanced and full-throated engagement with any confusion about 
consent. Restorative justice processes could enhance the accused’s ability to 
take responsibility for the harm that he caused. They can acknowledge and 
use positively the web of relationships in which the accuser and accused find 
themselves. Rather than reinforcing the silence and shame surrounding sexual 
encounters, they can air them.  
The restorative justice recognition that every offense is also a breach to the 
community is particularly relevant. Under current compliance procedures, an 
accused can be removed from his dorm, his dining hall, and his classes, even 
before any investigation. The interim (and later permanent) step of removing 
the accused from the dorm or the classroom is very strong message of shameful 
dishonor. Even when not characterized as punishment, these remedial steps 
may operate as such. This can be counterproductive to the larger goal of 
having an accused take responsibility for having caused suffering, and 
learning from that. Formal,  professional restorative justice processes can hold 
the accused accountable without shunning him.   
Some colleges and universities have implemented restorative justice 
programs to address sexual  misconduct, and scholars and advocates 
are working to study their efficacy and make it easier for campuses to 
adopt successful restorative justice models.57 As Professor Coker explains, 
“[restorative justice] scholarship and practice rest on a set of underlying 
beliefs about the human capacity to change.”58 In an educational setting, the 
university has incentives to protect all students and to use processes that allow 
the participants to take responsibility for their actions, and to change attitudes 
and behaviors. I did not see enough protection, responsibility, or change in 
the adversarial Title IX adjudications in which I participated.  
Conclusion
The Title IX regulatory regime regarding campus sexual misconduct is a 
highly orchestrated and formal effort to reduce blame and shame of victims 
and impose responsibility and shame on perpetrators. Supported by strong 
activism and effective institutional leadership, it is also a stunning example 
56. Id. at 197.
57. For a description of a particularly impressive restorative justice Title IX program, see Project 
on Restorative Justice: Campus PRISM, skidmore College http://www.skidmore.edu/campusrj/
prism.php. Professor Coker provides an extensive description of current campus restorative 
justice programs, including relevant research, operational challenges, and case studies. See 
Coker, supra note 53, at 187-210. 
58. Id. at 189.
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of the power of a regulatory regime to change culture. The continuing 
positive impact of Title IX processes related to campus sexual violence and 
other misconduct demand attention to potential unfairness in current Title 
IX operations. Limiting overly expansive definitions of “sexual assault” and 
pursuing restorative justice approaches are two ways to improve Title IX 
complaint processes. We can hope that working to continually improve Title 
IX compliance procedures will make future generations of students less 
vulnerable to sexual violence and misconduct, whether serious sexual assault 
or any kind of sexual infraction or mistake. 
